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LAW OF TRUSTS IN CANADA By D. W. M. WATERS, TORONTO
The Carswell Company Limited. 1974. pp. 1070 (Hardbound: $80.00)
The author in his preface informs us that this book was conceived in
1965-66 when he was invited from England to teach a course in Trusts at the
University of Saskatchewan. At that time, he recognized the need for a Canadian text on the law of trusts. The Canadian legal community is indeed fortunate that in 1967, he was once again lured back to Canada - this time
by McGill University. Nine years after the book was conceived, we have
been presented with a monumental work of scholarship, the Law of Trusts in
Canada.The author's progeny weighs in at 4 pounds 10 ounces, or perhaps to
be more progressive we should say 2.1 kilograms. In addition to 983 pages of
text, it also has a 64 page Table of Cases and Table of Statutes, a 13 page
appendix and a 70 page index. Both the author and the publisher can take
justifiable pride in the appearance of the offspring. It is handsomely bound,
attractively printed and is unmarred by any birth defects such as serious typographical errors.
The publication of the Law of Trusts in Canadais a signal event. Because
of its importance, one feels compelled to compare it with other Canadian
legal treatises which are regarded as classics. For instance, when Professor
Austin W. Scott published his four volume treatise on The Law of Trusts, the
American treatises which reviewers considered that it would rank with were
Wigmore on Evidence and Williston on Contracts. The sad realization strikes
the Canadian reviewer that there are so few Canadian legal treatises and fewer
still which can be regarded as classics. Except for John D. Falconbridge's, The
Law of Mortgages of Real Estate and perhaps Franklin W. Wegenast's, The
Law of CanadianCompanies,there is unlikely to be any consensus as to a comprehensive Canadian legal treatise which would be regarded as constituting
an outstanding scholarly contribution. The sad realization about the dearth of
Canadian legal treatises is made even more poignant when one considers that
the first edition of Falconbridge's book on Mortgages was published in
1919 and Wegenast's book on Canadian Companies was published in 1931.
Measured against this background, practioners, law students and teachers
should be even more appreciative of the prodigious effort and the careful
scholarship vhich Professor Waters has combined to give us the first Canadian
treatise on Trusts.
The author states that in writing the book one of his primary objectives
was to focus on Canadian materials and as a result he has employed English
authorities only where they are of leading importance or Canadian law is
silent on the issue. As a very crude test of the Canadian focus of the book,
the reviewer has determined that of the 1,777 cases cited in the book, 1,182
cases or approximately 66 per cent are Canadian. The Canadian cases include
12 Privy Council decisions. The Privy Council was not very active in the
direct development of the Canadian law of trusts, thus whether one subscribes
to the fiction that the Privy council when it sat on appeal from a Canadian
jurisdiction sat as a Canadian court or not, the percentage of Canadian cases
is not materially influenced.
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Unlike Professor Austin W. Scott's treatise on Trusts, one of the few
criticisms of which was its failure to provide ready access to the relevant
statutes, Professor Waters has given due attention to legislation. For instance
with regard to Ontario, the author refers to 58 different statutes and in relation
to the Trustee Act alone, he makes 42 references to sections or subsections
of the Act. It should, I believe, be recognized that it is a much more onerous
task to write a Canadian book on Trusts than an English book on Trusts in
that one is confronted with legislation by twelve law jurisdictions, which
directly affects trusts, and in addition federal legislation which often has a
significant impact on trusts. Writing about the American law of trust is even
more onerous and this perhaps accounts for the fact that, for instance, Bogert,
The Law of Trusts and Trustees is substantially larger than Professor Waters'
book.
Although the author states that he has adopted in large measure the
traditional subject breakdown, I believe that his division of the book into
seven parts consisting of a total of thirty chapters is a distinct improvement
over the breakdown in the English texts with which the reviewer is familiar.
The author indicates that his book is intended to be not only a reference work
for practioners but also to assist students "to learn the subject as it exists in
Canada." Both practioner and students will be pleased to find that this is not
simply an arid and technical treatise about what the law is. It is often an
interesting account of why and how the law has developed the way it has,
which the author accompanies with thoughtful suggestions for reform. There
is a good balance between discussion of principles and a description of the
cases and statutes.
In the introductory chapter of the book, the author arouses the interest
of the reader by taking examples of diverse situations occurring in different
cities across Canada which give rise to the application of trust law. Although
in a book of approximately 1,000 pages it is difficult to sustain the momentum,
the excellent style of the author which is almost conversational in tone contributes greatly to making it a very readable book. The book is also notable
for its clarity of expression and exposition. There is no attempt to side-step
difficult issues and in cases where there is doubt about the resolution of the
issue, it is forthrightly admitted by the author.
The author notes that for the continuous reader he has provided a focus
in Part IV of the book, entitled "Modem Uses of the Trust". This part consists
of three chapters. Chapter 12, "Personal and Business Trusts", and Chapter
13, "Trusts and Estate Planning", are likely to be of considerable interest to
most readers. The much longer Chapter 14, "Charitable Trusts", is unlikely to
excite many readers and fewer still will regard it as part of the focus of the
book. It is, I believe, regrettable that the author did not elaborate on Chapter
12 in which he has introduced a functional classification of trusts. The major
classification is between personal and business trusts. Business trusts are then
further divided among: 1) business trusts in furtherance of personal purposes, for example, trusts arising out of employment pension plans, profit
sharing trusts and registered retirement savings plans administered by trust
companies; 2) business trusts in furtherance of personal business or small
business arrangements, for example, the trust as a holding device arising out
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of a buy-sell agreement, stock purchase agreements, a stock voting trust and
business sale trusts; and 3) business trusts in furtherance of commerce at large,
for example, trusts employed as a substitute for incorporation, trusts as a
vehicle for pre-incorporation financial holding, trusts as a security device and
trusts as a vehicle for investment. The manifold business functions of the trust
are unfortunately compressed into less than nine pages. Since English texts do
not even provide this overview and since Waters has decided to adhere to
Scott's position that the business application of the trust is best considered in
works on commercial law, it is perhaps unfair not to be thankful for the perceptive outline of the business functions of the trust. We can perhaps hope
that in a future book the author will develop the modem business application
of the trust.
I believe the author was correct to include chapter 13, "Trust and Tax
Planning" in Part IV, "Modem Uses of the Trust", to provide a focus for the
continuous reader. I believe that, by isolating estate or tax planning in a
separate course and the business functions of the trust in a course on Company
or Commercial law, often the material left in the Trust course appears rather
sterile and students have considerable difficulty in relating to it because of the
lack of a modem context. This dilemma, arising from too narrow a classification of a subject matter, the author has fortunately avoided. The avoidance of
this dilemma, however, carries with it a price and that price is rapid obsolence
of such a chapter. As noted in his addendum, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland
have joined the other Atlantic provinces in repealing their Succession Duty
and Gift Tax Act. The Ontario budget brought down on April 7, 1975, also
necessitates considerable modification of this chapter with the basic succession
duty exemption going from $150,000 to $250,000 and the annual gift tax
exemption per donee being increased from $2,000 to $5,000 and the aggregate annual exemption increased from $10,000 to $25,000.1
Chapter 11, "The Constructive Trust", is perhaps the chapter in which
the author might have been expected to make his most significant contribution.
The author's earlier book, The Constructive Trust with the subtitle, The Case
for a New Approach in English Law, was described by a reviewer as "The
most searching and thought provoking criticism of the constructive trust in
English law to date." 2 In that previous book, the author stated: "The constructive trust needs a totally new look,... Within the precedents that English
I Waters states that Ontario and Quebec have reversed their original reaction to the
estate tax field by the federal government by recently reducing their rates of succession
duty. It is not accurate to say that Ontario reversed its original reaction. After the precipitous withdrawal by the federal government from the estate tax field, the Treasurer of
Ontario, Mr. McKeogh, introduced an interim measure to protect provincial revenue on
December 13, 1971. He stated that, "Our tax effort in this area would be judged in
future years against the effectiveness of the taxation of capital gains. In other words,
as the. tax on capital gains gradually matures, our succession duties can be phased down.
In the end there may no longer be any need for us to levy succession duties on death."
The reduction in succession duty is not a reversal. If there has been a reversal, it is perhaps in dropping any reference to eventual withdrawal. In the 1974 budget, the Treasurer
of Ontario, Mr. White, stated "Let me reiterate the Government's policy on succession
duties. We intend to continue to tax large accumulations of wealth..
2 W. H. Angus (1965), 30 Sask. Bar. Rev. 256 at 259.
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law has ... the seed lies for the development of this new restitution remedy.
But it is certain that it will be a very long time coming, unless we can com-

mence to teach the constructive trust with our eye on that seed."'3 The Canadian seed for this development is more numerous and hardy and therefore it
is disappointing that the author has not attempted to nurture and encourage
this Canadian seed to a greater extent. In the text of the chapter on "The Constructive Trust" neither Deglman v. GuaranteeTrust Company4 nor Paharav.
Pahara5 are discussed. On page 334, the author simply states that "In recent
years others have gone further, and said that the obligation is based on the
principle of unjust enrichment." In the footnote, the decision of Mr. Justice
Stark in Jirna Ltd. v. Mister Donut of Canada Ltd. is mentioned but the
author does not quote the judge's words that "A constructive trust therefore
arises and is imposed in order to prevent unjust enrichment." 6 Also mentioned in the footnote is Mr. Justice Laskin's dissent in Murdoch v. Murdoch7

and the author then states, referring to the principle of unjust enrichment,
that "even if it can be said that principle has now been accepted as a head
of liability (Restitution) in common law Canada (see (1964), 42 Can. Bar
Rev. 529), it has not yet had an impact upon the rationalization of the
constructive trust, save for Laskin, J.'s recent dissent." It must, however,
be noted that the author did discuss Mr. Justice Laskin's dissent more fully
in the prior chapter entitled, "The Reading Trust". Nevertheless, the author
has perhaps maintained too staunchly that the constructive trust remains
largely an institution like the express trust instead of giving more credence
to lines of authority which stress the constructive
trust as "a remedial vehicle
8
for restitution because of unjust enrichment."
In a treatise of this size, there are obviously some interpretations of the

law with which one might take issue but to carp at length about isolated points
3 D. W. N. Waters, The Constructive Trust (London: The Athlone Press, 1964)
at 73.
4 [1954] S.C.R. 725; [1954] 3 D.L.R. 785.
5 [1946] S.C.R. 89; [1946] 1 D.L.R. 433.
6 [1970] 3 O.R. 629 at 641; 13 D.L.R. (3d) 645 at 657, reversed on other grounds,
[1972] 1 O.R. 251; 22 D.L.R. (3d) 639, affirmed (1973) 40 D.L.R. (3d) 303 (Can.).
7 [1974] 1 W.W.R. 361; 41 D.L.R. (3d) 367; 13 LF.L. 185 (S.C.C.).
8 Text, page 339. An important case, decided subsequently to the publication of Professor Water's book, which emphasizes that unjust enrichment is a basis of the constructive trust is Re Spears and Levy (1975), 52 D.L.R. (3d) 146 (N.S.S.C. Appeal Div.).
In this case, a man and a woman went through a marriage ceremony and lived together
believing themselves to be married. However, the woman had been previously married
and although she thought she had obtained a divorce, no divorce had been granted. The
man died intestate. The Probate Court awarded the woman $24,600 on the basis of
quantum meruit. On appeal, it was held that the woman, although not validly married
to the deceased, was entitled to the intestate share of a widow of $25,000, on the basis
of a constructive trust. MacKeigan C.J.N.S. stated at p. 154, "I believe that the solution
of the problem rests in the law of trusts, that versatile handmaiden of equity, without
using any fictions, stretching any facts or distorting any principles of law or equity. The
heirs at law on Mr. Spears' death received legal title to his lands and goods, but did so
subject to the equitable rights of Mrs. Spears. Those rights give rise to a constructive
trust requiring the heirs to deliver his lands and goods up to her. The constructive trust
is invoked to prevent unjust enrichment of the heirs, to ensure they do not get what they
have no right to get."
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of doubt and difference would detract unfairly from the author's very substantial achievement. However, there are a few minor errors which should be
mentioned. On page 443, the author states that the U.K. Accumulations Act
of 1800 "became operative in each of the common law provinces of Canada,
and the territories, as part of the adoption of English law, and it still applies
today, except in Prince Edward Island, British Columbia, Ontario and
Alberta." English law was received into the colonies of Nova Scotia,9 New
Brunswick, Prince Edward Island and Upper Canada' 0 before the Accumulations Act, 1800 was passed. Thus the U.K. Accumulations Act of 1800 has
never applied in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Ontario or Prince Edward
Island. New Brunswick, like Ontario, passed an Act largely based on the U.K.
model and it is now sections 1 to 3 of the Property Act." However, Nova
Scotia has never passed an Accumulations Act and thus the only limitation
on an accumulating trust is that imposed by the rule against perpetuities.
As the author notes the Accumulations Act of 1800 has been abolished in
Alberta. 12 Thus Nova Scotia and Alberta lack any special restriction upon
accumulating trusts but the difference is that in Nova Scotia no restriction has
ever existed but in the territory which became Alberta the Accumulations
Act of 1800 applied from the date of reception of English law, 1870, until
1972.
Another minor error occurs in Chapter 29, "Trusts and the Conflict of
Laws" at page 962 where the author states "a testamentary instrument purporting to devise lands will be formally valid if the law of the testator's last
domicile would admit such validity." This is true in regard to the Wills Act,
1963 of the U.K., but it is incorrect in every common law jurisdiction in
Canada. The archaic rule still exists in common law in Canada that the formal
validity of a will of immovables is determined solely by the law of the situs.
This is a particularly unfortunate rule in Canada because eight law jurisdictions permit the holograph form while it is not accepted by the internal law of
British Columbia, Nova Scotia, Ontario and Prince Edward Island. It is to
be hoped that a more liberal conflict rule in regard to the formal validity of
wills of immovables will soon be enacted. The Wills Act, 1963 of the U.K.
which implemented the Hague Convention on the conflict of laws relating to
the form of testamentary dispositions concluded on October 5, 1961 would
serve as a model. A will, whether it disposes of movables or immovables, is
formally valid if it complies with the internal law in force - where it was
executed, where the testator had his habitual residence, was domiciled or
was a national, either at the time of its execution or at the time of his
death. All these additional connecting factors can be utilized to uphold the
formal validity of a will disposing of land under the U.K. Act, supplementing

0 Uniacke v. Dickson (1848), 2 N.S.R. 287 is generally regarded as having established the proposition that English law was received as of 1758 into what are now the
provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island.
10 Oct. 15, 1792 is the date of reception of English law in Upper Canada 32 Geo.
M, c. 1. This date is affirmed by The Property and Civil Rights Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 367.
1 R.S.N.B. 1973, c. P-19.
12 The PerpetuitiesAct, S.A. 1972, c. 121, s. 24(1).
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the one rule which exists in common law Canada that a will of land must
comply with the law of the situs.' 3
The author in his preface emphasized his objective of bringing Canadian
material to light. It therefore seems pertinent to consider whether Canadian
decisions and statutes have wrought any significant change in the contours of
the English law of trusts. The author does indicate a few differences. For
instance, he points out that Canadian courts did not enter an age of religious
intolerance and never adopted the old English doctrine of superstitious uses.
The author also notes that a more liberal attitude has been adopted by some
Canadian courts with regard to trusts involving political purposes. In Farewell v. Farewell,'4 Boyd, C. in 1892 held that a fund which trustees were
to use to promote the adoption by the Dominion Parliament of legislation
prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquor was a valid charitable gift. More
than fifty years later in the National Anti-Trust Vivisection Society v.
LR.C.,15 the House of Lords adopted a rigid and narrow proposition that
activities directed toward legislative change were political and were consequently excluded from the category of charities. Ontario courts have also
launched out on their own by applying the equitable doctrine of conversion
and apportionment of residuary estates, based on Howe v. Dartmouth", and
Re Earl of Chesterfield's Trusts,1 7 to land in addition to personality. The
book mentions other differences but they are of an equally minor nature.
Subsequently, the author has likened the development of the law of trusts
to the movement of a glacier as compared with other fields such as consumer
protection and labour law.' 8 This seems to be a good analogy as little that is
distinctively Canadian emerges from the case law.
With regard to statutes, probably the two most significant changes are
the adoption of the "prudent man" rule in New Brunswick' 9 and the Northwest Territories2 ° in place of the old "legal list" found in Trustee Acts enumerating the assets which qualify as trustee investments, and the abolition

'sA very minor error occurs on pages 83 and 84 when the author states that
"In the Canadian common law provinces, as in English law, no infant can make a valid
will, unless he is a member of the armed forces, or a marine or seaman at sea or on
voyage." This is a correct statement for every common law jurisdiction with the exception of Newfoundland. In Newfoundland, although the age of majority is nineteen, the
Wills Act, R.S.N. 1970, c. 401, s. 3 provides that a person may make a valid will on
attaining the age of seventeen. Another extremely minor error occurs on page 202 in
footnote 48, where the author states that "the witnesses and the testator must all be
present together when each witness signs." It is necessary that a testator sign or acknowledge his signature in the presence of two witnesses before either witness signs but after
witness one signs it is permissible for witness one to leave before witness two signs Re Brown, [1954] O.W.N. 301 at 302.
14 (1892), 22 O.R. 573.
15 [1948] A.C. 31; [1947] 2 All. E.R. 217.
16 (1802), 7 Ves. J. 137; 32 E.R. 56.
'7 (1883), 24 Ch.-D. 643.
'sLaw of Trusts, Four O'clock Series, The Canadian Bar Association (1975) 1.
19 S.N.B. 1971, c. 73, s. 2.
20 O.N.W.T. 1971, (2nd Sess.) c. 20, s. 1.
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in Alberta2 ' of the rule in Saunders v. Vautier22 which often defeated the
intention of the settlor. The adoption of the "prudent man" rule appears to
be largely the work of the Uniformity Commissioners in Canada, but it cannot
be regarded as distinctively Canadian as it has been imported from Massachusetts, or perhaps it is more accurate to say that it is a return to the
prudent man rule of equity. The author provides a very interesting account
of the historical development which led to the adoption of the "legal list."
It appears to be the result of the South Sea bubble reinforced by bankruptcies
falling in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars. The "legal list" emphasized fixed
interest securities and the conservation of wealth in terms of its dollar value.
Rampant inflation is finally bringing about the realization that beneficiaries
cannot be protected by inflexible rules. The abolition of the rule in Saunders
v. Vautier in Alberta is a distinctive Canadian contribution. It is not merely
the adoption of the general American doctrine 3 that a court will not terminate
a trust if the material purpose for which the settlor established the trust has
not yet been fulfilled. Instead it is a good compromise between the interest
of the beneficiary in terminating the trust and having the corpus transferred
to him and the wishes of the settlor that the trust should continue for the
intended duration. The compromise effected is to permit termination only
with the consent of the court and, following the principle established in variation of trusts legislation, the court has a discretion to vary or revoke the trust
so that the court may uphold the wishes of the settlor or the beneficiary or
approve a variation lying between these two extremes. This legislation is the
result of the work of the Institute of Law Research and Reform of Alberta
24
which acknowledged the\great assistance received from Professor Waters.
A book review of a comprehensive treatise cannot even attempt to
sketch the basic themes of the author. However, it can, I believe, be said that
the author has painted the trust on a broad canvas with skill, perspective and
fondness. 25 It is a book which can be compared favourably with any of the
English treatises on trusts. It deserves and doubtlessly will come to be recogS.A. 1973, c. 13, s. 12.
(1841), 4 Beav. 115, affirmed Cr. &Ph. 240; 41 E.R. 482.
23 Claflin v. Cla/fin (1889), 149 Mass. 19.
24
Institute of Law Research and Reform, University of Alberta, Report 9 (The
21

22

Rule in Saunders v. Vautir), (1972) at 26.
25 The author's fondness for the trust has prompted him to argue for more favourable income tax treatment of trusts. This is a view which the reviewer cannot share. In
my view, trusts are predominantly utilized for their tax avoidance potential. The ill
advised abandonment of the death duty field by the federal government at the end of
1971, for which the deemed disposition of capital property on death is no adequate substitute, the absence of succession duty and gift tax in the Atlantic provinces and Alberta,
the defective succession duty legislation in Ontario and Quebec are factors which militate
in favour of stringent tax treatment for trusts. Succession is one of the most potent
forces preserving the large wealth inequality which exists in Canada and trusts are
a mode of transmitting wealth to other generations. Under existing circumstances more
favourable tax treatment does not appear warranted. My disagreement with the author
stems from a divergent view about the kind of society which should prevail in Canada.
I would like to see greater equality of condition in Canada because in its absence equality
of opportunity will remain largely a hollow slogan. Professor Waters' fondness for the
trust is, I believe, firmly rooted in an acceptance of the status quo.
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nized as an authoritative book. Practitioners will find it an indispensible
guide to Canadian decisions and statutes. Practitioners, even if they cannot
deduct the cost of eighty dollars as an expense for income tax purposes, will
be able to charge capital cost allowance of twenty per cent as a class 8
capital asset. Unfortunately there will be few students sufficiently affluent
to afford the book. However, I anticipate that there will be a heavy student
demand for the book in law school libraries in Canada.
Gordon Bale*
* Professor,

Faculty of Law, Queen's University.

